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Professional Responsibility-North Carolina's View of the Lawyer
and the Perjurious Witness
A fundamental right of -an accused in our -adversary system of
criminal justice is the right to be represented by counsel' who will zeal-
ously advocate -his cause against the State.2 In fulfilling this duty of
zealous advocacy the lawyer, as an officer of the court, is required by
the ethical code of his profession always to function within the bounds
of the law.3 Against this background, and in the difficult context of
the trial of an indigent defendant represented by a court-appointed attor-
ney, the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Robinson4 was forced
to grapple with one of the most difficult ethical problems faced by the
defense attorney: what must the lawyer do to fulfill his duties to client
and court when, before trial, his client informs him of his intention to
proffer perjured testimony and of his desire to call a witness who will
commit perjury? The supreme court's decision was -that the trial court's
"compromise" solution-denying counsers request to withdraw, but
giving him no responsibility for eliciting what he believed to be perjured.
testimony-denied defendant -a fair trial. 5  If this decision is neither
limited nor overruled,.the proper answer to an already perplexing ques-
tion for the attorney is even more doubtful -than before.
Defendant Jerome Robinson was found guilty in the Superior
Court of Mecklenburg County of felonious breaking -and entering and
of larceny. 6 Prior to the entry of a plea to the indictment, defendant's
court-appointed attorney, William Burns, -moved jointly with Robinson
that Burns be allowed to withdraw from the case and that substitute
counsel be appointed.1 In support of the motion, Burns informed the
1. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. ABA CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSBILrY, Canon 7 (1969); ABA STAND-
AmiS, THE DEFEN SE FUNCnON § 1.1(b) (Approved Draft, 1971) [hereinafter cited as
ABA STmNDA Ds].
3. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmmrrY, Canon 7 (1969); ABA STAND-
ARS, supra note 2, at § 1.1(b).
4. 290 N.C. 56, 224 S.E.2d 174 (1976).
5. Id. at 67, 224 S.E.2d at 180.
6. Id. at 57, 224 S.E.2d at 175. A previous trial for the same offenses ended
in a mistrial. Defendant Robinson was represented by William Bums, but there is no
mention in the record of conflict between the two over the use of possibly perjured testi-
mony. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 5, State v. Robinson, 28 N.C. App. 65, 220
S.E.2d 387 (1975).
7. The motion and ensuing remarks by the judge, defense counsel and defendant
on each occasion were made in the absence of either prospective or impaneled jurors.
290 N.C. at 58, 224 S.E.2d at 175.
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court that a "substantial conflict '" had arisen because of defendant's
desire, and counsel's unwillingness, to offer at trial what counsel believed
would be perjured testimony by defendant and a defense witness.' On
three subsequent occasiofis during -the course of the trial, defendant,
either joined by counsel or on his own behalf, renewed the same motion.
On each occasion the motion was denied, the trial judge refusing to
shift the ethical burden to another attorney who, the judge assumed,
would also refuse to present false testimony. 10 Instead, Burns was left
to the alternative of remaining in charge of certain portions of the trial
without obligation to participate in eliciting the allegedly perjured testi-
mony.
1
In accordance with the court's plan, Bums remained seated at the
counsel table throughout the trial and, as counsel for defendant, cross-
examined the State's witnesses. 2 He called only one defense witness,
Carolyn Bertha,'" and after eliciting her responses to some preliminary
questions, requested that she tell her story to the jury.14 At the close of
Bertha's statement Burns remained silent and defendant took charge of
8. Id.
9. Id. Burns made the following statement to the court:
The defendant has indicated to me he wishes to take the witness stand in his
own behalf; which, in my opinion, is perjured testimony. He has indicated he
intends to call a witness to the witness stand and elicit testimony which would
be perjured testimony to that individual; and I feel that on the basis of that,
substantial conflict has arisen between the defendant and myself which would
prevent me from devoting my full effort to his representation in this matter;
and in addition to that, I don't feel that 1 should participate in the matter any
further because of the foregoing; and I do respectfully request that I be allowed
to withdraw as counsel for the defendant.
Id. Bums also based his belief that the testimony would be perjurious on previous state-
ments alleged to have been made to him by the witness and on his own independent
investigation of the case. Id. at 62, 224 S.E.2d at 177. Defendant denied having told
his lawyer that the witness' testimony would be false. Id. at 63, 224 S.E.2d at 178.
10. I d. at 59, 224 S.E.2d at 175.
11. Id. at 59-60, 224 S.E.2d at 176. In colloquy with defendant, the trial judge
described the extent of counsel's responsibility:
Mou can defend yourself of [sic] perjured testimony if you want to; but I'm
not going to ask a lawyer to; I'll let Mr. Bums sit by you and pick a jury,
examine the State's witnesses in your behalf; but when it comes to your de-
fense, if you're going to offer perjured testimony, I'm going to let Mr. Bums
sit there silently and ask you nothing. When you come on the witness stand,
you're on your own.
Id.
12. Id. at 60, 224 S.E.2d at 176.
13. Defendant chose not to testify in his own behalf. Id. at 62, 224 S.E.2d at 177.
14. Id.'at 63, 64, 224 S.E.2d at 178. The court gave the following instructions
about the examination" of the witness: "I'm going to allow you to call the witness, iden-
tify her by name and address, and you can tell her to say whatever she wants to say
about it and you won't have to ask her any questions about it." Id. at 63, 224 S.E.2d
at 178.
PERJURIOUS WITNESS
the direct examination of the witness. 15 Counsel did not later argue
the witness' testimony in a closing statement to the jury. 6
Defendant appealed his conviction on the ground that the trial
judge denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel
when he denied the motion to allow Burns. to withdraw and refused to
appoint substitute counsel.' 7  The North Carolina Supreme Court held
that there was no such denial.' The court reasoned that although an
indigent defendant in a state criminal prosecution has the constitutional
right to effective assistance of competent counsel appointed by the
court to represent him,' 9 he .does not have the right to demand that
counsel, appointed and representing him within the bounds of the law,
be removed and replaced because of defendant's unfounded dissatisfac-
tion with his services. 20 The representation afforded defendant did not,
in the court's view, render his trial a "farce and a mockery of justice" ;21
therefore, the supreme court ruled that the trial judge did not- abuse
his discretion in finding that Burns' refusal to participate in a fraud on
the court was not a good cause for his replacement by another attorney. 22
The court went on to hold, however, that defendant did have the
right to elect to represent himself and to refuse the services of counsel
with whom he was clearly in irreconcilable conflict over the course to
be adopted in his defense.23 According to the supreme court the trial
court's adoption of a "middle course, ' 24 although intended to provide
needed assistance, served .rather to convey to the jury that there was
discord between defendant and his lawyer, and that counsel attached
little credibility to the testimony of the only defense witness. 25 The
resulting prejudice to defendant's case was therefore held to have denied
15. Id. at 64.
16. Brief for Appellee at 4, State v. Robinson, 28 N.C. App. 65, 220 S.E.2d 387
(1975).
17. 290 N.C. at 58, 224 S.E.2d at 175. The court of appeals found no error. State
v. Robinson, 28 N.C. App. 65, 220 S.E.2d 387 (1975).
18. 290 N.C. at 66, 224 S.E.2d at 180.
19. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); State v; Sneed, 284 N.C. 606,
201 S.E.2d 867 (1974).
20. See cases cited note 32 infra.
21. State v. Sneed, 284 N.C. 606, 612, 201 S.E.2d 867, 871 (1974). See also cases
cited note 34 infra.
22. 290 N.C. at 66, 224 S.E.2d at 180. See also note 34 infra.
23. 290 N.C. at 67, 224 S.E.2d at 180. See, e.g., State v. Alston, 272 N.C. 278,
158 S.E.2d 52 (1967); State v. Morgan, 272 N.C. 97, 157 S.E.2d 606 (1967); State v.
Elliott, 269 N.C. 683, 153 S.E.2d 330 (1967); State v. McNeil, 263 N.C. 260, 139
S.E.2d 667 (1965).
24. 290 N.C. at 67, 224 S.E.2d at 180.
25. Id.
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him the fair trial Tequired by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.2 6 Accordingly, a new trial was ordered.
7
Cases dealing with the issue of the indigent defendant's right to
counsel have uniformly held that such a defendant must accept the
lawyer appointed by the court to represent him unless he wishes to pro-
ceed in his own behalf 28 or can establish a substantial reason for substi-
tution of new counsel. The courts have also been consistent in holding
that "whether to appoint a different lawyer for an indigent criminal
defendant who expresses dissatisfaction with his court-appointed counsel
is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the [trial] court."20
A bare allegation of "unfounded dissatisfaction"30 with a competent
assigned lawyer, who is "'proceeding according to his best judgment
and the usually accepted canons of criminal trial practice,' "31 will not
constitute good cause for his replacement.32 Rather, a defendant must
make a sufficient showing that under the particular cicumstances of
his case, his constitutional right to effective assistance will be substan-
tially impaired or denied by the court's refusal to grant his request for the
appointment of another lawyer.3 3
In North Carolina there is a heavy burden on defendant, for the
standard of proof is a stringent one: "[Tjhe general rule [is] that the
26. Id.
27. Id. At the new trial, defendant is to be represented by his current court-ap-
pointed lawyer or other competent counsel selected by the court. If such counsel is un-
satisfactory to defendant, he may elect to conduct his own defense without a lawyer.
Id.
28. E.g., United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1973); BrowA v. United
States, 264 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Campbell v. State, 231 Md. 21, 188 A.2d 282
(1963) (per curiam); State v. McNeil, 263 N.C. 260, 139 S.E.2d 667 (1965); State v.
Wilkinson, 12 Wash. App. 522, 530 P.2d 340 (1975). If defendant wishes to proceed
in his own behalf, unsatisfactory counsel cannot be forced on him. See cases cited note
23 supra. See also Note, Criminal Procedure-The Right to Proceed Pro Se: ludicial
Gymnastics with the Sixth Amendment, 54 N.C.L. Rnv. 705 (1976).
29. United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 1973). But see Tague,
An Indigent's Right to the Attorney of His Choice, 27 STAN. L. REV. 73 (1974).
30. State v. Moore, 6 N.C. App. 596, 598, 170 S.E.2d 568, 570 (1969).
31. State v. McNeil, 263 N.C. 260, 270, 139 S.E.2d 667, 673-74 (1965) (quoting
Annot., 157 A.LR. 1225, 1226 (1945)).
32. E.g., United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1973) (defendant unrea-
sonably believed that counsel was communicating confidences to the prosecutor); Brown
v. United States, 264 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (counsel pessimistic about defendant's
chances for a favorable verdict); United States v. Gutterman, 147 F.2d 540 (2d Cir.
1945) (counsel advised defendant to plead guilty in the face of overwhelming evidence
and refused to call a witness defendant wanted to testify); State v. Gibson, 14 N.C. App.
409, 188 S.E.2d 683 (1972) (defendant desired an attorney who would do more for
him); State v. Scott, 8 N.C. App. 281, 174 S.E.2d 80 (1970) (defendant dissatisfied with
counsel because unreasonable bond had been set); State v. Moore, 6 N.C. App. 596, 170
S.E.2d 568 (1969) (counsel had a negative attitude).
33. For a compilation of cases see Annot., 157 A.L.R. 1225 (1945).
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- incompetency (or one of its many synonyms) of counsel... is not a
Constitutional denial of [the] right to effective counsel unless the attor-
ney's representation is so lacking that the trial has become a farce and a
mockery of justice."34  Only in extreme circumstances is it likely that
such a deprivation will be found."
To understand properly the significance of the court's holding that
Robinson was ultimately denied a fair trial, some knowledge of the
professional debate about the duties and obligations of the lawyer
confronted with the perjurious witness, and of the sources to which he
may turn for guidance, is essential. The official standards governing
the conduct of the legal profession are contained in the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility;36 it is in interpreting the admonitions and pro-
34. State v. Sneed, 284 N.C. 606, 612, 201 S.E.2d 867, 871 (1974). See, e.g.,
Snead v. Smyth, 273 F.2d 838 (4th Cir. 1959); Doss v. North Carolina, 252 F. Supp.
298 (M.D.N.C. 1966); Edgerton v. North Carolina, 230 F. Supp. 264 (E.D.N.C. 1964).
Although North Carolina still follows the farce-mockery standard first established
in Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945), other
jurisdictions (including the Sixth Circuit, which first decided Diggs) have rejected it as
a standard for deciding whether an accused has been denied effective assistance of coun-
sel. Rather, effective counsel is "counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering
reasonably effective assistance." MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960).
Accord, Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974); West v. Louisiana, 478
F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd on rehearing, 510 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1975) (per
curiam); Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See generally Beaney,
The Right to Counsel: Past, Present, and Future, 49 VA. L. REv. 1150 (1963); Note,
Criminal Defendants Entitled to Reasonably Competent Assistance of Counsel, 12 AM.
CruM. L. REv. 193 (1974); Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel for the Indigent De-
fendant, 78 HARv. L. RMv. 1434 (1965).
35. Duboise v. North Carolina, 225 F. Supp. 51, 53 (E.D.N.C. 1964). In Duboise
the court cited Jones v. Cunningham, 297 F.2d 851 (4th Cir. 1962), as an example of
such extreme circumstances. (Counsel was appointed on the day of defendant's trial,
made no investigation of the case, yet advised a guilty plea because defendant had pre-
viously made a coerced confession.)
36. The Code was promulgated by the American Bar Association in 1969 to re-
place the Canons of Professional Ethics that had been in effect since 1908. ABA CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmm, Preface (1969).
The Code is divided into Canons, Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules:
The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms
the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships
with the public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession. They
embody the general concepts from which the Ethical Considerations and the
Disciplinary Rules are derived.
The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the
objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive. They
constitute a body of principles upon which the lawyer can rely for guidance
in many specific situations.
The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are mandatory
in character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct
below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action.
Id. Preliminary Statement (footnote omitted). North Carolina adopted the Code (with
modifications) in 1974, pursuant to a resolution of the North Carolina State Bar, 283
N.C. 783 (1973).
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hibitions of the Code that members of the profession have divided.8 7
The "traditional" point of view (among whose exponents is Chief
Justice Warren Burger)18 is that although the lawyer in our adversary
system of justice owes a high duty of zealous advocacys9 and strict con-
fidentiality"0 to -his client, he is simultaneously an officer of the court
who must always conduct himself within the bounds of the law.41  Given
this duty, never, under any circumstances, may a lawyer knowingly
proffer perjured testimony and thereby participate in a fraud upon the
court." If the client reveals his intention to take the stand and to lie,48
37. In an attempt to give further practical guidance to those confronting ethical
problems in criminal trial practice, the American Bar Association has also adopted
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (Ap-
proved Draft, 1971). When used in the Standards "the term 'unprofessional conduct'
denotes conduct which is or should be made subject to disciplinary sanctions. Where
other terms are used, the standard is intended as a guide to honorable professional con-
duct and performance." ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at § 1.1(f).
38. Burger, Standards of Conduct For Prosecution And Defense Personnel: A
Judge's Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRiM. L.Q. 11 (1966).
39. "The basic duty the lawyer for the accused owes- to the administration of justice
is to serve as the accused's counselor and advocate, with courage, devotion and to the
utmost of his learning and ability, and according to law." ABA STANDARDS, supra note
2, at § 1.1(b). See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 7 (1969).
40. A lawyer is prohibited from revealing a confidence or secret of his client and
from using a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client. ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsrBIL , DR 4-101 (B) (1)-(2) (1969).
"Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege
under applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information gained in the pro-
fessional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the dis-
closure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental
to the client.
id. DR 4-101(A). See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at § 3.1(a), and Commentary.
41. Burger, supra note 38, at 12. See note 39 supra; ABA CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-1 (1969).
The North Carolina Supreme Court, although it cites none of the authorities, ap-
pears to agree with this proposition: the lawyer "is an officer of the court and owes
duties to it as well as to his client. In this there is no conflict of interest." State v.
Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 66, 224 S.E.2d 174, 179 (1976).
42. Burger, supra note 38, at 12. The Code provides that "[in his representation of
a client, a lawyer shall not:
(4) Knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence.
(7) Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal
or fraudulent.
(8) Knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to a Dis-
ciplinary Rule.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMILITY, DR 7-102(A) (4), (7), (8) (1969).
The lawyer is subject to discipline for misconduct as provided in id. DR 1-102.
43. On the related issue of the lawyer's duty to reveal a fraud already perpetrated
upon the court by his client, see ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-
102(B) (1969); ABA COMM. ON ETHCS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Formal
Opinions, No. 341 (1975); ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at § 7.7, Commentary.
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and if counsel is unable to dissuade him or to withdraw44 from the case,
counsel "may not engage in direct examination... to facilitate known
perjury. He should confine himself to asking the witness to identify
himself and to make a statement." 45  Neither may the lawyer argue
the truth of a lying witness' testimony in his closing statement to the
jury.46 Rather, he must argue the case "on the sufficiency of the govern-
ment's testimony and the other evidence offered by the defense, exclu-
sive of the . . .perjured testimony."
47
Critics of the traditional position are led by Dean Monroe Freed-
man, and it is his answer -to the "perjury question" that has been the
subject of heated reaction since first offered in 1966.48 Freedman
postulates that the attorney attempting to follow the ethical standards
of his profession and, at the same time, to live up to his special responsi-
bilities as partisan advocate in our adversary system finds himself in
an impossible "trilemma ' '4" when faced with the problem of perjured
testimony. 50 "That is, the lawyer is required to' know everything, to
keep it in confidence, and to reveal it to the court." 51 Although the
Code prohibitions that a lawyer shall not "[k]nowingly use perjured
44. The Code provides that a lawyer may seek to withdraw from a case if his client
insists that he "pursue a course of conduct that is illegal or that is prohibited under the
Disciplinary Rules," ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-110(C) (1) (c)
(1969), but offers no guidance as to what the lawyer should do if withdrawal is not
allowed.
Although Burger does not address the issue, others in substantial agreement with
his position believe that in seeking to withdraw, the attorney may not reveal any confi-
dences of his client (i.e., the reasons for withdrawal are privileged). ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 2, at § 7.7(c); Bress, Standards of Conduct of the Prosecution and Defense
Function: An Attorney's Vidwpoint, 5 AM. CRim. L.Q. 24 (1966); Gold, Split Loyalty:
An Ethical Problem for the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 14 CLEv.-MAR. L Rnv. 65 (1965).
45. Burger, supra note 38, at 13. Although the Code gives no guidance beyond
the prohibitions of DR 7-102(A) (4), (7) and (8), "the recommendations of the stand-
ard as to the steps to be taken by the lawyer when he must remain in the case after
learning of his client's intent to commit perjury are regarded as appropriately avoiding
violation of the Disciplinary Rules." ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at § 7.7(c), Com-
mentary.
Burger also believes that "[slince this informal procedure is not uncommon with
witnesses, there is no basis for saying that this tells the jury the witness is lying. A
judge may infer that such is the case but lay jurors will not." Burger, supra note 38,
at 13.
46. Bress, supra note 44, at 24; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at § 7.7(c).
47. Bress, supra note 44, at 24.
48. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MicH. L. REv. 1469 (1966).
49. M. FREEDMAN, LAwYERs' ETcs IN AN ADvERSARY SYSTEM 28 (1975).
50. Id. at 27.
51. Id. at 28. "Mhe difficulties presented by those conflicting obligations are
particularly acute in the criminal defense area because of the presumption of innocence,
the burden upon the state to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right
to put the prosecution to its proof." Id.
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testimony," 52 "[c]ounsel or assist his client in conduct that the law-
yer knows to be illegal or fraudulent,"53 or "[k]nowingly engage in
other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to a Disciplinary Rule""
seem fairly clear, the Code does not indicate how a lawyer is to go about
fulfilling his obligations when faced with a criminal defendant who
proposes to testify falsely.5
It is Freedman's view that once the attorney has pried and cajoled
all the relevant facts from a client, having assured the client that full
disclosure is necessary to a successful defense'6 and "will never result
in prejudice to the client by any word or action of the attorney,"5 7 the
attorney must honor his obligation of confidentiality. 58  If the client
proposes to perjure himself
the attorney's obligation... would be to advise the client that the
proposed testimony is unlawful, but to proceed in the normal fash-
ion in presenting the testimony and arguing the case to the jury
if the client makes the decision to go forward. Any other course
would be a betrayal of the assurances of confidentiality given by
the attorney in order to induce -the client to reveal everything
59
Freedman rejects the course of withdrawal as not viable, particularly
in the case of the indigent defendant, since in most jurisdictions a court-
appointed lawyer or public defender will not be allowed to withdraw
from a case unless he establishes an extraordinary reason for moving
for leave to withdraw."1 Freedman also rejects the Burger solution of
putting -the witness on the stand merely to tell his story, unaided by his
lawyer, and of ignoring his testimony in closing argument, as too highly
52. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSImIUTY, DR 7-102(A) (4) (1969).
53. Id. DR 7-102(A) (7).
54. Id. DR 7-102(A) (8).
55. M. FREEDmAN, supra note 49, at 29.
56. Id. at 30.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 31.
60. Freedman views withdrawal as an avoidance of the ethical problem, since de-
fendant, if lie is not indigent, will retain another lawyer from whom he will withhold
any incriminating information or the fact of guilt. The new lawyer will be ignorant
of the proposed perjury and, therefore, will be unable to discourage the client from pre-
senting it. Id. at 33.
61. Id. Thus, the attorney must either lie to the judge about his reason for moving
to withdraw or else reveal that he has received knowledge of his client's guilt. The latter
alternative would violate the obligation of confidentiality, especially since in many juris-
dictions the same judge who allows the lawyer to withdraw will later hear the case and
sentence the defendant. Id. at 34.
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prejudicial to defendant's caseP2 because of adverse inferences a jury
will draw from such a -procedure.
In Robinson the North Carolina Supreme Court followed a clear
line of precedent in rejecting defendant's sixth amendment-based claim
that he was denied effective -assistance of counsel.63 The court itself,
apparently motivated by a feeling ithat the -trial afforded Robinson was
less than fair, raised the due process issue that provided the basis for
reversal of defendant's conviction. Unlike the lengthy analysis of the
already clear limitations on the indigent's right to counsel, the court's
disposition of the fair trial issue was not accompanied by an informed
discussion of the intense controversy over the proper role for the lawyer
who, in the course of representation, must deal with a potentially per-
jurious witness."4  In finding for defendant on due process grounds,
without proper regard for the complex ethical issue that the situation'in
Robinson presents, the court created a dilemma for the defense attorney
who would attempt to reconcile his duties to his client with those to
the code of his profession.
Not once in its opinion did the supreme court allude to or cite any
of the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Amer-
ican Bar Association Standards. Yet the court's assertion that Burns
clearly had no duty to proffer perjured testimony 5 is consistent with
the prohibitions of the Code 6 and the Standards. 7  Despite this appar-
ent agreement with Code and Standards, the court rejected the procedure
adopted by the trial court for the examination of a perjurious witness 0
(substantially the same procedure adopted by the Standards) 9 on the
ground that such trial tactics inevitably prejudiced defendant's case
62. Id. at 37. One practical criticism Freedman offers is that a prosecutor might
object to a witness' narrative since it would deprive him of the opportunity to object
to inadmissible evidence before it is heard by the jury. A more serious criticism is that
jurors will draw prejudicial inferences from such conduct by an attorney who, they as-
sume, knows the truth about about the defendant's case. Id. Freedman adds:
There is, of course, only one inference that can be drawn if the defend-
ant's own attorney turns his or her back on the defendant at the most critical
point in the trial, and then, in closing argument, sums up the case with no ref-
erence to the fact that the defendant has given exculpatory testimony.
Id. Further, if a defendant is discouraged by this procedure from taking the stand in
his own behalf, as is his right, most would agree that his chances of conviction are in-
creased. Freedman, supra note 48, at 1475.
63. See text accompanying notes 29-32 for a discussion of the precedent.
64. 290 N.C. at 58, 224 S.E.2d at 175.
65. Id. at 59-60, 224 S.E.2d at 179.
66. See Code provisions quoted note 42 supra.
67. See ABA STANDARDs, supra note 2, at § 7.5(a), and Commentary.
68. See notes 11 & 14 supra.
69. See ABA STANDARDs, supra note 2, at § 7.7(c).
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in the eyes of the jury and thereby denied him a fair trial. 70 The court,
surprisingly, is in substantial agreement with Freedman's estimation of
the effect of limited participation by the lawyer;71 the court, however,
would surely not advocate Freedman's course of putting the lying wit-
ness on the stand, cross-examining in the conventional manner, and
arguing the truth of known false statements to the jury.72 Even Freed-
man would concede that the case for confidentiality and loyalty to the
client is not so strong if an alibi witness, as in Robinson, and not de-
fendant himself, takes the stand to lie; 3 nevertheless, the court still found
prejudice. Perhaps the court was influenced by the fact that defendant's
only witness against strong evidence offered by the State was made to
appear incredible, and that defendant himself was deterred from testify-
ing in his own behalf by the procedure the trial court adopted. 4
The American Bar Association. Standards and many of the com-
mentators clearly take the position that it is a breach of the lawyer's
duty of confidentiality to the client to reveal the reason-perjury-for
wishing to withdraw from a case.75 The court, with no discussion, cited
Burns' actions in so doing as "commendable. ' 7  Neither did the court
address the corollary problem of possible prejudice to defendant when
the same judge who has been informed of his alleged desire to perjure
himself is also called upon to sentence defendant after conviction. 7
The Robinson decision is now one more factor to be weighed by
the attorney at the point in time when he is informed by a client of the
client's intention to commit perjury. If the client is indigent, the lawyer
knows it is unlikely a court will allow him to withdraw and appoint re-
placement counsel.78  Apparently, he cannot stay on the case and offer
70. 290 N.C. at 67, 224 S.E.2d at 180; see note 62 supra.
71. See note 62 supra.
72. M. FREMMAN, supra note 49, at 31.
73. Id. at 32.
74. See note 11 supra.
75. See note 44 supra.
76. 290 N.C. at 66, 224 S.E.2d at 180.
77. Before sentencing, the trial judge addressed the following remarks to defendant
Robinson:
Why didn't you take the advice of your attorney? You're as guilty as sin, and
there wasn't any doubt in anybody's mind in this courtroom, or on that jury.
They didn't take five minutes to find you guilty. You're the kind that makes
mockery of this system. Your attorney attempted to advise you as best he
could, that you were .guilty and that you should enter a plea of guilty ...;
but you wouldn't see it that way. Your guilt was as obvious as anybody I've
ever tried. Any other man in your situation would -say, "I'm caught," and "Be
merciful". . . . Do you want to say anything before I sentence you?
Defendant's Statement of Case on Appeal at 49-50, State v. Robinson, 28 N.C. App.
65, 220 S.E.2d 387 (1975).
78. 290 N.C. at 66, 224 S.E.2d at 179.
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the assistance the ethical norms allow since the court has by indirection
rejected the solution of the American Bar Association Standards. 9 The
lawyer familiar with the workings of the criminal justice system, who
feels some sympathy with the plight of a defendant faced with possible
imprisonment who wants and needs the guidance of a lawyer in present-
ing his defense, will be forced to take a hard look at his alternatives
before leaving defendant to the course of self-representation.
The seeming inability or reluctance of the court to confront the
hard ethical issues is apparently *a reflection of the larger problem of
the inadequacies and inconsistencies of the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility itself. The new Code was long in the making and long awaited
by those lawyers who found the truisms of the Canons outdated and
sorely lacking in practical guidance in dealing with specific problems
of professional responsibility. Experience under the revised Code would
seem to indicate that many of the old problems have been rewritten
into its -provisions, and that the Code, too, suffers from a lack of clarity
and practical guidance.
Canon 7 prohibits the lawyer's knowing use of perjured testimony. 0
Canon 2 allows him to withdraw if continued representation of a client
would likely result in violation of a Disciplinary Rule."' Thereafter the
Code is sirangely silent on the subject of what the lawyer should do if
permission to withdraw is denied, as is more often than not the case
if the lawyer has been appointed to represent an indigent defendant.
The American Bar Association Standards supply the solution, which
purportedly avoids violation of the Disciplinary Rules.82 The Standards
are careful to point out that revelation of the reason for withdrawal
would constitute a breach of Disciplinary Rule 4-101, s3 yet the Stand-
ards advocate the course of allowing delendant to present his perjured
testimony unaided by his attorney. This solution has the practical ef-
fect of informing both judge and jury that the lawyer, because of knowl-
edge of his client's guilt, believes the testimony to be false."' The
North Carolina Supreme Court would seem to agree.85
79. Id. at 67, 224 S.E.2d at 180.
80. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-102(A) (4) (1969). See
note 42 supra.
81. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-110(C)(1)(c) (1969).
See note 44 supra.
82. See note 45 supra.
83. See note 44 supra.
84. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 49, at 37.
85. 290 N.C. at 67, 224 S.E.2d at 180.
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Although a lawyer is subject to disciplinary action for violation of
the prohibitions of Canon 4, there is clear disagreement on how to read
the exceptions to the requirement of confidentiality.8 6 It would seem
to be an obligation of the authors of the Code that on such an important
question the language of the Rules be precise, so that a lawyer may
discern what he must do in order to comply. The Standards, too, are
inconsistent, at one point denouncing the idea of proffering perjured
testimony in the name of confidentiality as "universally repudiated by
ethical lawyers,"87 yet later admitting that there is disagreement among
experienced lawyers about how to proceed and preserve confidentiality.88
Those persons in a position to promulgate the Standards that are
to give ethical guidance to the profession clearly must go further in
defining what the limits of our adversary system are. Although we
sanction the "lie" of a "not legally guilty" plea by the accused who is
"guilty in faot ' 9 and do not foreclose to him the opportunity to make
his case to the jury even if he wishes to lie,90 we still must decide what
we wish the role of the lawyer in the system to be. Freedman seems to
believe that the criminal defendant, until he is tried and convicted, re-
mains in a -totally blameless state, entitled to the undivided loyalty and
full cooperation of his attorney in making his defense, even if the
86. Canon 4 provides that a lawyer may reveal:
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or re-
quired by law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information nec-
essary to prevent the crime.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmILrry, DR 4-101 (C) (2), (3) (1969).
Some would read the "may" language as permissive only, thus freeing the lawyer
to exercise his discretion to reveal or not reveal a client's intention to commit perjury.
The lawyer would be immune from discipline either way. See Callan, Professional Re.
sponsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client Misconduct in an Ad.
versary System, 29 RuT. L_ REv. 332, 354 (1976). ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PRO.
FESSIONAL RESPONSIrILITY, Formal Opinions, No. 287 (1953) supports the proposition
that perjury is included within the definition of "crime."
Others read the DR 4-101(C)(3) exception along with ABA COMM. ON ETHICS
AND PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrTY, Formal Opinions, No. 314 (1965), which is cited
in a footnote to the Disciplinary Rule, to require the lawyer -to exercise his discretion
in certain situations and to reveal client confidences, despite the "may" language. See
Rotunda, Book Review, 89 HAv. L. REv. 622, 626-27 (1976).
87. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 142. For some interesting information on
what lawyers confronted with the perjury problem actually do, see Friedman, Profes-
sional Responsibility in D.C.: A Survey, 25 RES IPsA LoQ. 60 (1972); Reichstein, The
Criminal Law Practitioner's Dilemma: What Should the Lawyer Do When His Client
Intends to Testify Falsely?, 61 J. CiM. L.C. & P.S. 1 (1970).
88. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at § 7.7, Commentary.
89. Freedman, supra note 48, at 1471.
90. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 276.
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defendant wishes to testify falsely -and to enlist the aid of his attorney
in so doing. In answer to Freedman, one commentator has aptly said:
[T]he very existence of the special rights accorded a defendant
whose liberties are at stake-appointed counsel, the fifth amend-
ment privilege, jury trial, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and
others-militates against adding the right to compel counsel to
allow the client to perjure himself and even ethically require the
counsel to argue the client's false story to the jury.91
Although he owes his client the duty of zealous representation, the
lawyer's own values, his honesty and his integrity, are also at stake.
These values should not be sacrificed to the client who, by choosing to
pursue an illegal course of conduct, brings on his own prejudice.
If Freedman's solution elevates the duty of confidentiality to the
client at too great an expense to the lawyer, then a compromise such as
the trial court's, however flawed, that attempts to preserve the law-
yer's duty both to his client and to the court, is necessary. Unless the
holding in Robinson is somehow limited to the particular facts of the
case or overruled, the court would seem to have foreclosed the possibility
of such a compromise solution for the North Carolina attorney.
DEBORAI A. BRIAN
Securities Regulation-Challenging the Short Form Merger
Through Rule 10b-5 and the Corporate Purpose Doctrine
In the wake of the depressed securities markets of the 1970's, a
corporate phenomenon known as "going private" has become increas-
ingly prevalent.' "Going private" usually entails the buying out of pub-
lic minority shareholders of a corporation by a few majority share-
holders so as to take the corporation outside the scope of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and its attendant reporting requirements.2 The
danger inherent in this'mechanism, and one of the reasons it has drawn
increasingly close judicial scrutiny, is that in many cases it allows a few
91. Rotunda, supra note 86, at 627.
1. See Borden, Going Private--Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 987 (1974).
2. See Note, Going Private, 84 YALE LJ. 903, 904 (1975).
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